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FitzGerald, Frances. Way Out There in the Blue:
Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold War. New
York: Simon and Schuster, 2000. 499pp. $30
In 1984, while the Cold War was raging,
then-Senator Gary Hart expressed a sen-
timent shared by many then and now:
“It’s unfortunate and tragic. The Reagan
Administration has to understand that
our relationships with the Soviet Union
spring from whether or not we’re achiev-
ing arms control. If we’re not achieving
arms control, then it spills over into and
colors every other aspect of our relation-
ship.” While it purports to be something
else, Frances FitzGerald’s Way Out There
in the Blue adopts the same theme. It is
virtually impossible to turn to any page
in the book and not find a critical discus-
sion of arms control—mostly, of course,
regarding the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty.
Folks who work in the U.S. government
often say, “We know we don’t get it right
all of the time, but can we really get it
wrong all of the time?” The author, how-
ever, can find no redemption for the Rea-
gan years—they got it wrong, at every
step, all of the time. Those who toiled in
Washington through those years were
both wrongheaded and wrong-hearted,
according to FitzGerald. As a conse-
quence, as analysis the book is deficient;
it qualifies more appropriately as applied
ideology. As a wag once put it, “Ideology
is a filter through which facts pass for
interpretation.”
So, the story of Way Out There in the
Blue is of a simple-minded President
Reagan surrounded and captured by
hard-line anticommunists, bent on con-
frontation with the Soviet Union and
heating up the arms race in pursuit of a
foolish dream. On essentially every page
one feels the author’s contempt and dis-
dain, derision and ridicule, for the “star
wars” program and for the benighted ap-
proach of the two Reagan administra-
tions. This is not a balanced attempt to
understand the policy and politics of the
Reagan years but a savage skewering.
The book’s focus is on politics and arms
control, but the author’s lack of under-
standing of strategy deeply undermines
her already flawed presentation. Through-
out the book FitzGerald ridicules the no-
tion that a defense, any defense, can be
perfect. However, strategists recognize
that perfection is not at issue. A defense
need be only good enough to forestall an
attack. If an attacker can be made to be-
lieve that his offensive thrust will fail,
then the defense will not be challenged.
For example, if an attacker has twenty
ballistic missile warheads and is faced by
a defense with interceptors each of which
is judged to be 80 percent effective, he
might, if he chooses to disarm himself by
firing all of his warheads, expect to have
four warheads penetrate the defense.
Well, that might be true if the defense
shoots only one interceptor at each in-
coming warhead. On a given day, the de-
fense might opt to use more than one, so
its effectiveness might be significantly
better than 80 percent. Accordingly, a
reasonable strategic assumption of
would-be attackers would be that oppos-
ing defenses will work, and will work well.
Yet there is another overarching strategic
factor at work here. To shoot missiles at
the United States is not the same as
shooting them at Australia or Belgium;
whether or not any missiles get through
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the American defenses, one must antici-
pate a devastating nuclear reply. This
strategic fact is bound to affect anyone
who is not merely suicidal. Therefore, on
the prospect that the defense might work
well enough, and given the certainty of a
powerful response, a nonsuicidal enemy
will have considerable hesitation about
attacking. That hesitation is increased—it
is in no way decreased—by an in-place
ballistic-missile defense. As a conse-
quence, strategically speaking, the issue
of “perfect” defense is a phony one.
Moreover, the author shows no under-
standing whatsoever of the power of sep-
arate layers of defense. The fact that a
three-tiered defense in which each tier
has 80 percent effectiveness has an over-
all system effectiveness in excess of 99
percent goes completely unremarked.
Also, much is made here of the notion
that the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
sought to make nuclear weapons “impo-
tent and obsolete.” This is closely related
in the book to the ridiculous notion of
“perfect” defenses. In his speech of 23
March 1983, however, President Reagan
called upon the scientific community to
“give us the means of rendering those
nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.”
The strategic argument—that it is when
one is convinced that an attack could not
succeed that those weapons become “im-
potent and obsolete”—has totally escaped
FitzGerald.
Most serious, however, is the failure of
FitzGerald to understand that the Reagan
administration set out deliberately to re-
turn, after the debacle of the Carter ad-
ministration, to an active containment of
Soviet imperialism and to accelerate the
erosion of the Soviet system from within.
The SDI was part of this overall strategy,
which was set forth in National Security
Decision Directive 75, dated 17 January
1983, entitled “U.S. Relations with the
USSR.” Although this document—origi-
nally classified “Secret Sensitive”—was
declassified and released in 1994, the
book makes no mention of it. Clearly this
information was available to FitzGerald,
and one is left to speculate as to reasons
for its absence. Perhaps it is because
NSDD-75 says clearly that the United
States “should continue to resist Soviet
efforts to return to a U.S.-Soviet agenda
focused primarily on arms control.”
That, of course, offends the very essence




Russian General Staff. The Soviet-Afghan War:
How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Edited by Lester
W. Grau, translated by Michael A. Gress. Lawrence:
Univ. Press of Kansas, 2002. 364pp. $45
This book, edited by Lester Grau of the
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center at
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is the last of a
trilogy that covers the Soviet-Afghan War
of 1979–89. His translator, Michael
Gress, served in the Soviet Army in Af-
ghanistan. Volume 1, The Bear Went over
the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in
Afghanistan, was an early translation of
original Russian documents prepared by
student-officers—who had direct combat
experience in Afghanistan—at the Frunze
Military Academy in Moscow. It was first
published in Russian in 1991, then re-
published in English in 1996 by the Na-
tional Defense University. For the second
volume, The Other Side of the Mountain:
Mujahedeen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan
War (1996, U.S. Marine Corps Combat
Development Command, Quantico, Va.),
Grau had the valuable assistance of Ali
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